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Abstract	Chinese	companies	have	increasingly	targeted	East	Central	European	(ECE)	countries	in	the	past	one	and	a	half	decades.	This	development	is	quite	a	new	phenomenon	but	not	an	 unexpected	 one.	 On	 one	 hand,	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 global	 economy	 and	 the	restructuring	 of	 China’s	 economy	 are	 responsible	 for	 growing	 Chinese	 interest	 in	 the	developed	world,	including	the	European	Union.	On	the	other	hand,	ECE	countries	have	also	become	more	open	 to	Chinese	business	opportunities,	 especially	after	 the	global	economic	 and	 financial	 crisis	 with	 the	 intention	 of	 decreasing	 their	 economic	dependency	on	Western	(European)	markets.	 In	ECE,	China	can	benefit	a	 lot	 from	the	EU’s	 core	 and	 peripheral	 type	 of	 division.	 For	 China,	 the	 region	 represents	 dynamic,	largely	 developed,	 less	 saturated	 markets,	 new	 frontiers	 for	 export	 expansion,	 new	entry	 points	 to	 Europe	 and	 cheap	 but	 qualified	 labour.	 This	 adds	 up	 to	 less	 political	expectations,	 less	 economic	 complaints,	 less	 protectionist	 barriers	 and	 less	 national	security	concerns	in	the	ECE	region	compared	to	the	Western	European	neighbours. 
JEL:	F21,	F23,	O53,	P33	
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Introduction	
Emerging-country	 multinational	 companies	 are	 increasingly	 integrating	 into	 the	world	 economy	 through	 foreign	 direct	 investment	 (FDI),	 with	 Chinese	 outward	 FDI	being	 the	most	 spectacular	 case	 in	 terms	 of	 rapid	 growth,	 geographical	 diversity	 and	takeovers	 of	 established	 Western	 brands.	 Chinese	 firms	 invest	 mainly	 in	 Asia,	 Latin	
                                               1	This	paper	was	written	 in	 the	 framework	of	 the	National	Research,	Development	and	 Innovation	Office	(NKFIH)	 research	 project	 "Non-European	 emerging-market	 multinational	 enterprises	 in	 East	 Central	Europe"	 (K-120053)	 and	 also	 supported	 by	 the	Bolyai	 János	 Fellowship	 of	 the	 Hungarian	 Academy	 of	
Sciences.	2	 Research	 fellow,	 Centre	 for	 Economic	 and	 Regional	 Studies	 of	 the	 Hungarian	 Academy	 of	 Sciences	Institute	 of	 World	 Economics,	 Tóth	 Kálmán	 Street	 4,	 H-1097	 Budapest,	 Hungary	 Email:	szunomar.agnes@krtk.mta.hu	
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 America	 and	 Africa,	 where	 they	 seek	 markets	 and	 natural	 resources.	 However,	developed	economies	have	recently	also	become	important	targets,	offering	markets	for	Chinese	products	and	assets	Chinese	firms	lack.	Europe,	 for	 example,	 has	 emerged	 as	 one	 of	 the	 top	 destinations	 for	 Chinese	investments.	According	to	Rhodium	Group's	statistics,	annual	foreign	direct	investment	flows	in	the	28	EU	economies	has	grown	from	EUR	700	million	in	2008	to	EUR	30	billion	in	2017,	 that	 represents	 the	quarter	of	 total	Chinese	FDI	outflows	 last	year.	However,	Chinese	approach	towards	Europe	is	far	from	being	unified	since	China	follows	different	motives	and	uses	different	approaches	when	dealing	with	different	countries	or	regions	of	Europe	(Szunomár	2017):	the	access	to	successful	brands,	high-technology	and	know-how	 motivates	 China	 when	 entering	 Western	 European	 markets,	 investments	 in	 the	green	energy	industry	and	sustainability	brings	Chinese	companies	to	Nordic	countries,	while	 greenfield	 investments	 (manufacturing),	 acquisitions	 and	 recently	 also	infrastructural	projects	pulls	them	to	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	(CEE),	including	also	the	non-EU	member	Western	Balkan	countries.	In	 recent	 years	 Chinese	 companies	 have	 increasingly	 targeted	 CEE	 countries,	 with	East	Central	Europe3	(ECE)	-	the	Czech	Republic,	Hungary,	Poland,	the	Slovak	Republic	and	 Slovenia	 -	 among	 the	 most	 popular	 destinations.	 Although	 compared	 with	 the	Chinese	economic	presence	in	the	developed	world	or	even	in	Europe,	China’s	economic	impact	 on	 ECE	 countries	 is	 still	 small	 but	 it	 has	 accelerated	 significantly	 in	 the	 past	decade.	This	development	 is	quite	a	new	phenomenon	but	not	an	unexpected	one.	On	one	 hand,	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 global	 economy	 and	 the	 restructuring	 of	 China’s	economy	are	responsible	for	growing	Chinese	interest	in	the	developed	world,	including	Europe.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 ECE	 countries	 have	 also	 become	 more	 open	 to	 Chinese	business	opportunities,	especially	after	the	global	economic	and	financial	crisis	of	2008,	
                                               3	Throughout	the	research	ECE	is	referred	to	as	the	five	new	EU	member	states	which	are	members	of	the	OECD	 as	 well,	 namely:	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	 Hungary,	 Poland,	 the	 Slovak	 Republic	 and	 Slovenia.	 The	Central	and	Eastern	European	 (CEE)	region	 is	a	broader	 term	–	comprising	Albania,	Bulgaria,	Croatia,	the	Czech	Republic,	Hungary,	Poland,	Romania,	the	Slovak	Republic,	Slovenia,	and	the	three	Baltic	States:	Estonia,	Latvia	and	Lithuania.	Therefore,	the	paper	does	not	focus	on	the	whole	CEE	region,	however	in	some	cases	 the	examples	of	 the	ECE	countries	will	be	supplemented	with	some	of	 the	CEE	countries.	  
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 with	 the	 intention	 of	 decreasing	 their	 economic	 dependency	 on	Western	 (European)	markets.	In	line	with	the	above,	the	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	map	out	the	main	characteristics	of	Chinese	 investment	 flows,	 types	 of	 involvement,	 and	 to	 identify	 the	 host	 country	determinants	 of	 Chinese	 FDI	 within	 the	 ECE	 region,	 with	 a	 focus	 on	structural/macroeconomic,	institutional	and	also	political	pull	factors.	According	to	our	hypothesis,	pull	determinants	of	Chinese	 investments	 in	ECE	region	differ	 from	that	of	Western	 companies	 in	 terms	 of	 specific	 institutional	 and	 political	 factors	 that	 seem	important	 for	 Chinese	 companies.	 This	 hypothesis	 echoes	 the	 call	 to	 combine	macroeconomic	 and	 institutional	 factors	 for	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	internationalization	 of	 companies	 (Dunning	 and	 Lundan	 2008).	 The	 novelty	 of	 this	research	 is	 that	 -	 besides	 macroeconomic	 and	 institutional	 factors	 -	 it	 incorporates	political	 factors	 that	 may	 also	 have	 an	 important	 role	 to	 play	 in	 attracting	 emerging,	especially	Chinese	companies	to	a	certain	region.	As	the	topic	of	Chinese	FDI	in	European	peripheries	is	new,	started	to	draw	academic	attention	only	recently	and	the	available	literature	is	rather	limited	and	based	mostly	on	secondary	sources,	 the	author	conducted	several	personal	as	well	as	online	 interviews	with	representatives	of	various	Chinese	companies	in	the	ECE	region4.		After	 the	 introductory	 section,	 we	 briefly	 summarize	 the	 existing	 theories	 and	literature	 on	 the	 topic.	 The	 next	 chapter	 describes	 the	 changing	 patterns	 of	 Chinese	outward	 FDI	 in	 the	 ECE	 region,	 while	 the	 following	 chapter	 contains	 the	 author's	findings	on	characteristics	and	motivations	behind	Chinese	FDI	in	the	ECE	countries.	The	final	chapter	presents	the	author’s	conclusions5.	
                                               4	 At	 major	 Chinese	 investors	 in	 the	 region	 the	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 anonymously.	 The	 author	conducted	semi-structured	interviews	at	4	companies,	i.e.	she	drawn	up	a	questionnaire	and	structured	the	 interview	 based	 on	 some	 basic	 questions	 concerning	 the	 background	 of	 investment,	motivations	before	 the	 investment	and	 the	significance	of	 the	same	factors	 later,	a	 few	years	after	 the	 investment	took	 place.	 Several	 further	 questions	 arose	 based	 on	 the	 original	 questions	 and	 responses	 to	 them,	therefore	 the	 structure	 of	 each	 interviews	 was	 unique.	 Where	 interviews	 were	 not	 applicable	 (3	companies),	the	author	used	other	sources,	such	as	business	professionals,	experts	and	academics	from	ECE	countries.	5	The	author	will	usually	take	into	account	foreign	direct	 investment	by	mainland	Chinese	firms	(where	the	ultimate	parent	company	is	Chinese),5	unless	marked	explicitly	that	due	to	data	shortage	or	for	other	purposes	they	deviate	from	this	definition.	Since	data	in	FDI	recipient	countries	and	Chinese	data	show	
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 This	 paper	 is	 a	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 research	 that	 focuses	 on	 non-European	 emerging	market	 multinationals’	 (EMNEs)	 strategies,	 operation	 and	 challenges	 in	 East	 Central	Europe.	In	order	to	better	understand	the	rise	of	EMNEs	in	ECE	and	to	provide	a	good	basis	 for	 decision	 makers	 to	 develop	 policy	 options	 for	 EMNEs’	 adaptation	 and/or	integration	in	the	ECE	region,	the	research	team	covers	the	largest	recipient	countries	of	the	region	by	mapping	out	motivations,	operational	practices	and	challenges	of	EMNEs.	In	 the	 first	phase	of	 the	research	we	analysed	the	transnationalization	process	of	non-European	EMNEs,	with	regard	to	their	investments	in	ECE,	including	home	country	push	factors	 and	 state	 support	 (on	 China,	 see	 Szunomár	 2017).	 In	 the	 current	 phase	 we	turned	 towards	 the	main	 host	 country	 determinants	 -	 also	 known	 as	 pull	 factors	 -	 of	EMNEs	in	ECE.	The	upcoming	research	phase	will	focus	on	challenges	and	opportunities	through	a	case-study	approach	on	the	major	emerging	market	actors	present	in	the	ECE	region	by	conducting	in-depth	interviews	on	the	firm-level.		
Theory	and	literature	review6	
Majority	 of	 research	 papers	 and	 journal	 articleas	 on	motivations	 for	 FDI	 apply	 the	eclectic	or	OLI	paradigm	of	Dunning	(1992,	1998),	which	states	that	firms	will	venture	abroad	 when	 they	 possess	 firm-specific	 advantages	 –	 namely	 ownership	 and	internalisation	 advantages	 –	 and	when	 they	 can	 utilise	 location	 advantages	 to	 benefit	from	 the	 attractions	 particular	 locations	 provide.	 Different	 types	 of	 investment	incentives	 attract	 different	 types	 of	 FDI,	 which	 Dunning	 (1992)	 divided	 into	 four	categories:	 (i)	market-seeking	(tariff-jumping	or	export-substituting	FDI	 is	a	variant	of	market-seeking	FDI;	Kinoshita	and	Campos,	2003);	(ii)	resource-seeking;	(iii)	efficiency-seeking;	 (iv)	 and	 asset-seeking.	 The	 factors	 attracting	 market-seeking	 multinationals	usually	 include	 market	 size,	 as	 reflected	 in	 GDP	 per	 capita	 and	market	 growth	 (GDP	growth).	 Investments	 aimed	 at	 seeking	 improved	 efficiency	 are	 determined	 by	 -	 for	example	 -	 low	 labour	 costs,	 tax	 incentives	 (Resmini,	 2005:	 3).	 Finally,	 the	 companies	
                                                                                                                                                   significant	differences,	the	two	data	sets	will	usually	be	compared	to	point	out	the	potential	source	of	discrepancies	in	order	to	get	a	more	complex	and	nuanced	view	of	the	stock	and	flow	of	investments.	For	Chinese	global	outflows	statistics	from	Chinese	Ministry	of	Commerce	(MOFCOM)	and	UNCTAD	will	be	considered	and	compared.	6	This	section	is	based	on	McCaleb-Szunomár	(2017)	
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 interested	 in	 acquiring	 foreign	 assets	 might	 be	 motivated	 by	 a	 common	 culture	 and	language,	as	well	as	trade	costs	(Blonigen	and	Piger,	2014;	Hijzen	et	al.,	2008).		It	should	be	emphasised	that	some	FDI	decisions	may	be	based	on	a	complex	mix	of	factors	 (Resmini,	2005,	3;	Blonigen	and	Piger,	2014).	Much	of	 the	extant	 research	and	theoretical	 discussion	 is	 based	 on	 FDI	 outflows	 from	 developed	 countries,	 for	 which	market-seeking	 and	 efficiency-seeking	 FDI	 is	 most	 prominent	 (Buckley	 et	 al.,	 2007;	Leitao	and	Faustino,	2010).	Chinese	outward	FDI	 is	characterised	by	natural	resource-seeking,	 market-seeking	 (Buckley	 et	 al.,	 2007)	 and	 recently	 also	 by	 strategic	 asset-seeking	(Di	Minin	et	al.,	2012;	Zhang	et	al.,	2012)	motives.	The	rapid	growth	of	outward	FDI	from	emerging	and	developing	countries	has	been	subject	to	numerous	studies	trying	to	account	for	special	features	of	emerging-country	multinationals’	 behaviour	 that	 is	 not	 captured	 by	 mainstream	 theories.	 For	 example,	Mathews	 extended	 the	 OLI	 paradigm	with	 the	 ‘linking,	 leverage,	 learning	 framework’	(LLL)	 that	 explains	 the	 rapid	 international	 expansion	 of	 companies	 from	 Asia	 Pacific	(Mathews,	 2006).	 Linking	means	 partnerships	 or	 joint	 ventures	 that	 latecomers	 form	with	foreign	companies	in	order	to	minimise	the	risks	of	internationalisation,	as	well	as	to	acquire	‘resources	that	are	otherwise	not	available’	(Mathews,	2006:	19).	Latecomers	when	forming	links	with	incumbents	also	analyse	how	the	resources	can	be	leveraged.	They	 look	 for	resources	that	can	be	easily	 imitated,	 transferred	or	substituted.	Finally,	repeated	 processes	 of	 linking	 and	 leveraging	 allow	 latecomers	 to	 learn	 and	 conduct	international	operations	more	effectively	(Mathews,	2006:	20).	Nevertheless,	traditional	economic	factors	seem	to	be	insufficient	in	explaining	MNEs'	FDI	 decisions,	 especially	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 emerging	 MNEs.	 In	 the	 past	 decade	international	 economics	 and	 business	 research	 has	 acknowledged	 the	 importance	 of	institutional	factors	in	influencing	the	behaviour	of	multinationals	(for	example,	Tihanyi	et	 al.,	 2012).	According	 to	North,	 institutions	are	 the	 ‘rules	of	 the	game’,	 ‘the	humanly	devised	constraints	 that	shape	human	interactions’	 (North,	1990:	3).	 Institutions	serve	to	reduce	uncertainties	related	with	transactions	and	minimise	transaction	costs	(North,	1990).	As	a	result,	Dunning	and	Lundan	extended	the	OLI	model	with	institution-based	location	 advantages,	 which	 explains	 that	 institutions	 developed	 at	 home	 and	 host	
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 economies	 shape	 multinationals’	 geographical	 scope	 and	 organisational	 effectiveness	(Dunning	and	Lundan,	2008).	The	transformation	of	CEE	countries	from	centrally	planned	to	market	economies	has	also	generated	significant	research	on	FDI	flows	to	these	transition	countries.	However,	most	studies	focus	on	the	period	before	2004,	which	is	the	year	of	accession	of	eight	CEE	countries	into	the	EU	(Carstensen	and	Toubal,	2004;	Janicki	and	Wunnawa,	2004;	Kawai,	2006).	 Investors,	 mainly	 from	 EU15	 countries,	 were	 attracted	 by	 relatively	 low	 unit	labour	 costs,	 market	 size,	 openness	 to	 trade	 and	 proximity	 (Bevan	 and	 Estrin,	 2004;	Clausing	 and	 Dorobantu,	 2005;	 Janicki	 and	 Wunnawa,	 2004).	 Diverse	 institutional	factors	influenced	inward	FDI	but	the	prospects	of	their	economic	integration	with	the	EU	increased	FDI	inflows	in	almost	all	countries	(Bevan	and	Estrin,	2004).	When	analysing	the	impact	of	the	institutional	characteristics	of	CEE	-	including	ECE	-	countries,	such	as	forms	of	privatisation,	capital	market	development,	state	of	laws	and	country	 risk,	 the	 studies	 show	 varying	 results.	 According	 to	Bevan	 and	 Estrin	 (2004:	777)	 institutional	 aspects	were	 not	 a	 significant	 factor	 in	 the	 investment	 decisions	 of	foreign	 firms.	 Carstensen	 and	 Toubal	 (2004)	 argue	 that	 they	 could	 explain	 uneven	distribution	 of	 FDI	 across	 CEE	 countries.	 Fabry	 and	 Zeghni	 (2010)	 point	 out	 that	 in	transition	 countries	 institutional	 weaknesses	 –	 such	 as	 poor	 infrastructure,	 lack	 of	developed	 subcontractor	 network	 and	 an	 unfavourable	 business	 environment	 –	 may	explain	FDI	agglomeration	more	than	positive	externalities	 that	are	effects	of	 linkages,	such	 as	 spillovers,	 clusters	 and	 networks.	 Campos	 and	 Kinoshita	 (2008),	 based	 on	 a	study	of	19	Latin	American	and	25	East	European	countries	 in	 the	period	1989–2004,	found	that	structural	reforms,	especially	financial	reform	and	privatisation,	had	a	strong	impact	on	FDI	inflows.		Szunomár	and	McCaleb	(2017)	also	found	that	in	the	case	of	Chinese	MNEs’	motives	in	 CEE	 significant	 role	 is	 devoted	 to	 institutional	 factors	 and	 other	 less-quantifiable	aspects:	besides	EU	membership,	market	opportunities	and	qualified	but	cheaper	labour	important	 factors	 are	 the	 size	 and	 feedback	 of	 Chinese	 ethnic	 minority,	 investment	incentives	and	subsidies,	possibilities	of	acquiring	visa	and	permanent	residence	permit,	as	well	as	privatization	opportunities.	
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Changing	patterns	of	Chinese	outward	FDI	in	the	ECE	region	
	 The	 change	 of	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 European	 -	 including	 ECE	 -	 countries	 from	centrally	 planned	 to	 market	 economy	 resulted	 in	 increasing	 inflows	 of	 foreign	 direct	investment	to	these	transition	countries.	During	the	transition,	the	region	went	through	radical	 economic	 changes	which	 had	 been	 largely	 induced	 by	 foreign	 capital.	 Foreign	multinationals	 realised	 significant	 investment	 projects	 in	 this	 region	 and	 established	their	 own	 production	 networks.	 Although	 the	 majority	 of	 investors	 arrived	 from	Western	Europe,	the	first	phase	of	inward	Asian	FDI	came	also	right	after	the	transition:	Japanese	 and	 Korean	 companies	 indicated	 their	 willingness	 of	 investing	 in	 the	 ECE	region	already	before	the	fall	of	the	iron	curtain.	Their	investments	took	place	during	the	first	 years	 of	 the	 democratic	 transition.	 The	 second	 phase	 came	 after	 the	 New	Millennium,	 when	 the	 Chinese	 government	 initiated	 the	 go	 global	 policy,	 which	 was	aimed	 at	 encouraging	 domestic	 companies	 to	 become	 globally	 competitive.	 Therefore	Europe	-	including	European	peripheries	-	also	became	a	target	region	for	Chinese	FDI	(see	Szunomár	2017).	
Figure	1.	Chinese	FDI	stock	in	ECE	countries,	million	USD,	2003-2017	
	
Data	source:	MOFCOM	/	NBS,	PRC	
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 As	 Figure	 1.	 shows,	 Chinese	 outward	 investment	 stock	 in	 the	 five	 ECE	 countries	 has	steadily	 increased	in	the	 last	one	and	a	half	decades,	particularly	after	2004	and	2008,	the	 accession	 date	 to	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 economic	 and	 financial	 crisis,	 respectively.	According	to	Chinese	statistics,	it	means	a	real	rapid	increase	from	9,6	million	US	dollars	in	2004	to	673	million	US	dollars	in	2010.	By	2017,	the	amount	of	Chinese	investments	has	further	increased	and	reached	1009	million	USD	according	to	MOFCOM	(Ministry	of	Commerce	of	the	People's	Republic	of	China)	data.	It	is,	however,	also	true	that	FDI	flows	are	rather	hectic	(see	Figure	2)	and	are	connected	to	one	or	two	big	business	deals	per	year.	
	
Figure	2.	Chinese	FDI	flow	to	ECE	countries,	million	USD,	2007-2017	
	
Data	source:	MOFCOM	/	NBS,	PRC	Although	China	considers	the	Central	and	Eastern	European	region	as	a	bloc	(this	is	one	of	the	reasons	for	creating	the	16+1	initiative,	that	is	a	joint	platform	for	the	16	CEE	countries	and	China),	some	countries	seem	to	be	more	popular	investment	destinations	than	others:	the	selected	five	ECE	countries,	for	example,	host	almost	55	per	cent	of	total	Chinese	FDI	stock	in	the	16	CEE	countries	(see	Figure	3.).	Among	them,	Hungary,	Poland	and	Czechia	have	received	the	bulk	of	Chinese	 investment	 in	recent	years.	 In	contrast,	there	are	countries,	such	as	the	Baltic	states	or	Albania	and	Macedonia,	where	the	stock	of	Chinese	FDI	is	still	negligible.	
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Figure	3.	Chinese	FDI	stock	in	CEE	countries,	million	USD,	2017	
	
Data	source:	MOFCOM	/	NBS,	PRC	
At this point, it is important to note that Chinese MOFCOM'	 statistics	 are	 adequate	 to	show	 the	main	 trends	 of	 Chinese	 outward	 FDI	 stocks	 and	 flows,	 however,	 apart	 from	this,	 it	 proved	 to	 be	 a	 less	 reliable	 data	 source	 as	 it	 doesn't	 show	 those	 Chinese	investments	 that	 has	 flowed	 to	 a	 country	 through	 a	 foreign	 country,	 company	 or	subsidiary.	In	order	to	identify	the	home	country	of	the	foreign	investor	that	ultimately	controls	 the	 investments	 in	 the	 host	 country,	 the	 new	 IMF	 guidelines	 recommend	compiling	 inward	 investment	 positions	 according	 to	 the	 Ultimate	 Investing	 Country	(UIC)	principle.	For	example,	if	we	compare	Chinese	MOFCOM	database	with	two	other	databases	 -	 in	 our	 case,	 the	 China	Global	 Investment	 Tracker	 (CGIT)	 and	OECD	 -	 that	tracks	 back	 data	 to	 the	 ultimate	 parent	 companies	 (see	 Figure	 3.),	 we	 find	 major	differences	 in	 the	case	of	 the	main	recipients	of	Chinese	outward	FDI	 in	ECE	(Czechia,	Hungary	and	Poland).	In	most	cases,	the	difference	between	the	lowest	(MOFCOM)	and	the	highest	(CGIT)	dataset	is	more	than	tenfold.	On	one	hand,	this	discrepancy	justifies	the	assumption	that	Chinese	companies	are	indeed	using	intermediary	companies	when	investing	in	Europe,	including	ECE	countries,	while,	on	the	other	hand,	it	also	confirms	that	Chinese	FDI	 is	much	more	significant	 in	 the	ECE	region	-	especially	 in	 the	case	of		Czechia,	Hungary	and	Poland	-	than	previously	thought.	
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Figure	4.	Comparing	MOFCOM,	CGIT	and	OECD	data	on	China’s	outward	FDI	stock	in	Czechia,	Hungary	and	Poland,	2016/20177,	million	USD	
	
Data	source:	MOFCOM	/	NBS,	PRC,	CGIT,	OECD	Based	 on	 the	 Ultimate	 Investing	 Country	 principle	 we	 can	 also	 calculate	 the	percentage	share	of	Chinese	FDI	stocks	of	 total	 inward	FDI	stocks	 in	ECE	countries.	As	CGIT	statistics	often	contains	various	 infrastructure	projects	 -	such	as	 for	example	the	planned	costs	of	the	Budapest-Belgrade	railway	-	that	should	be	considered	separately	as	those	are	rather	credit	agreements,	we	decided	to	use	OECD	data	for	our	calculations.	As	expected,	shares	were	definitely	higher	when	calculating	with	ultimate	data	(OECD)	than	calculating	with	direct	investment	amounts	(MOFCOM),	however,	China's	share	of	total	 FDI	 in	 ECE	 is	 still	 far	 from	 being	 decisive:	 it	 is	 below	 1	 per	 cent	 for	 the	 Czech	Republic	and	Poland	(0,7	and	0,3,	respectively)	and	below	3	per	cent	(2,4)	for	Hungary.	It	 is	 even	 less	 -	 below	 0,3	 per	 cent	 -	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Slovakia	 and	 Slovenia.	 In	 these	countries,	(Western)	European	investors	are	still	responsible	for	more	than	70	per	cent	of	 total	 FDI	 stocks,	while	 among	 non-European	 investors,	 companies	 from	 the	United	States,	Japan	and	South	Korea	are	more	important	players	than	China.	
                                               
7 MOFCOM	and	CGIT	data	are	from	2017,	while	OECD	data	shows	2016	stock	of	Chinese	FDI.	
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Table	1.	Major	characteristics	of	Chinese	investment	in	ECE	region	
	 Hungary	 Poland	 Czechia	 Slovakia	 Slovenia	
Main	form	of	
investment	
Greenfield	 /	brownfield,	M&A,	 joint	ventures	
Greenfield	and	M&A	 Greenfield	and	M&A	 Greenfield	and	M&A	 M&A	 and	Greenfield	
Main	sectors	 Chemical,	 IT	/	 ICT,	electronics,	wholesale	and	 retail,	automotive,	banking,	hotels	 and	catering,	logistics,	 real	estate		
IT	 /	 ICT,	electronics,	heavy	machinery,	publishing	and	 printing,	real	 estate,	municipal	waste	processing	
Electronics,	IT	 /	 ICT,	transport	equipment,	automotive,	shipping,	engineering,	food,	 media,	plate-making	
automotive	industry,	 IT	/	ICT		
Chemical,	automotive,	airport	construction/airplane	production	industry,	electronics/	high	technology,	IT	/	ICT	
Most	
important	
Chinese	
companies	
Wanhua,	Huawei,	 ZTE,	Lenovo,	Sevenstar	Electronics,	BYD	Electronics,	ZMJ,	Comlink,	Yanfeng,	China-CEE	Fund	
Liu	 Gong	Machinery,	Huawei,	 ZTE,	Haoneng	Packaging,	Shanxi	Yuncheng	Plate-making	Group,	 Sino	Frontier	Properties	Ltd.,	 China	Everbright	International	Ltd.	
Shanxi	Yuncheng,	Changhong,	SaarGummi,	Noark,	Huawei,	 ZTE,	Shanghai	Maling,	COSCO,	YAPP,	CEFC,	Buzuluk	Komarov,	China	CNR	
SaarGummi,	ZVL	 Auto,	Inalfa	 Roof	Systems,	Mesnac,	Lenovo,	Huawei	
Zhejiang	Jinke	 Culture	Industry,	Elaphe,	 Sino-Pipistrel	 Asia	Pacific,	 TAM	Durabus,	Fotona,	Arctur,	 Acies	Bio,	 Chiho	Tiande	Group,	China-CEE	 Fund,	Huawei	
Source:	own	compilation		
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 As	 presented	 in	 Table	 1.,	 Chinese	 investors	 typically	 target	 secondary	 and	 tertiary	sectors	 of	 the	 selected	 five	 countries.	 Initially,	 Chinese	 investment	 has	 flowed	mostly	into	 manufacturing	 (assembly),	 but	 over	 time	 services	 attracted	 more	 and	 more	investment	as	well.	For	example,	in	Hungary	and	Poland	there	are	branches	of	Bank	of	China	 and	 Industrial	 and	 Commercial	 Bank	 of	 China	 as	well	 as	 offices	 of	 some	 of	 the	largest	law	offices	 in	China,	Yingke	Law	Firm	(in	Hungary	 in	2010,	 in	Poland	 in	2012),	Dacheng	Law	Offices	 (in	Poland	 in	2011,	 in	Hungary	 in	2012).	Main	Chinese	 investors	targeting	these	five	countries	are	interested	primarily	in	telecommunication,	electronics,	chemical	industry	and	transportation.	Although	the	main	form	of	investment	used	to	be	greenfield	in	the	first	years	after	Chinese	companies	discovered	the	ECE	region,	later	on	-	 especially	after	 the	global	 financial	 crisis	of	2008	 -	mergers	and	acquisitions	became	more	 frequent.	 The	 main	 reason	 behind	 this	 shift	 is	 that	 Chinese	 companies'	investments	 are	 increasingly	 motivated	 by	 seeking	 of	 brands,	 new	 technologies	 or	market	niches	that	they	can	fill	in	on	European	markets.	The	selected	five	ECE	countries	account	for	a	major	share	of	the	population	(around	66	 million)	 and	 economic	 output	 (more	 than	 1000	 billion	 USD,	 according	 to	 World	Bank)	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	and	all	of	them	have	strengthened	their	relations	with	China	in	recent	years.	Hungary	still	receives	the	majority	of	Chinese	investment	in	the	 region,	 followed	 by	 Poland	 and	 Czechia,	 while	 Slovakia	 and	 Slovenia	 lag	 a	 little	behind	 due	 to	 their	 small	 size	 and	 lack	 of	 efficient	 transport	 infrastructure.	 The	main	forms	and	sectors	of	Chinese	investment	are	similar	in	all	countries,	although	it	is	more	diverse	 in	 the	 more	 popular	 target	 countries	 (Hungary	 and	 Poland),	 while	 there	 are	certain	sectors	–	 for	example,	 tourism–	 in	which	Chinese	companies	have	preferred	to	target	Slovenia.	
	
Host-country	determinants	of	Chinese	OFDI	in	the	ECE	region	
Host	 country	 determinants	 -	 or	 pull	 factors	 -	 are	 those	 characteristics	 of	 the	 host	country	markets	that	attract	FDI	towards	them.	Pull	factors	-	just	like	push	factors	-	can	be	 grouped	 into	 institutional	 and	 structural	 factors.	 "While	 international	 and	 regional	investment	and	trade	agreements,	as	well	as	institutions	such	as	banks	or	IPAs	involved	
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 in	 OFDI,	 are	 counted	 as	 institutional	 pull	 factors,	 structural	 pull	 factors	 include	 low	factor	costs,	markets,	and	opportunities	for	asset-seeking	companies"	(Schüler-Zhou	Y.,	Schüller	M.,	Brod	M.	2012:	163).	Based	 on	 the	 literature	 (mentioned	 in	 our	 theory	 and	 literature	 review	 section)	 as	well	as	on	interviews	conducted	with	company	representatives	and	experts,	in	the	case	of	 Chinese	 MNEs,	 the	 main	 structural/macroeconomic	 pull	 factors	 -	 i.e.	 host	 country	determinants	that	can	"pull"	them	to	developed	markets	-	are:	
• market	access,		
• low	factor	costs	(such	as	the	relatively	low	cost	of	labour	force),		
• qualification	of	labour	force,		
• various	 opportunities	 for	 asset-seeking	 companies	 (such	 as	 brands,	 know-how,	 knowledge,	 networks,	 distribution	 channels,	 access	 to	 global	 value	chains,...)		
• company-level	relations	and		
• the	high	level	of	technology.		The	most	important	institutional	pull	factors	are:		
• international	 and	 regional	 investment	 and	 trade	 agreements,	 free	 trade	agreements	of	the	host	country	(or	that	of	the	EU),		
• host	 government	 policies	 (including	 strategic	 partnership	 agreements	between	the	government	and	certain	companies),		
• tax	incentives,	special	economic	zones	
• 'golden	visa'	programs	(residence	visa	for	a	certain	amount	of	investment)	
• institutions	 such	 as	 banks,	 government-related	 investment	 promotion	agencies	(IPAs),		
• institutional	stability	(such	as	IPR	protection,	product	safety	standards),		
• possibility	for	more	acquisitions	through	privatization	opportunities,		
• chance	for	participation	at	public	procurement	processes,	
• home	country	diaspora	in	the	host	country.	When	searching	for	possible	pull	factors	that	could	make	ECE	countries	a	favourable	investment	destination	 for	Chinese	 investors,	 the	 labour	market	 is	 to	be	considered	as	one	of	the	most	important	factors:	a	skilled	labour	force	is	available	in	sectors	for	which	Chinese	 interest	 is	 growing,	 while	 labour	 costs	 are	 lower	 here	 than	 the	 EU	 average.	
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 However,	there	are	differences	within	the	broader	Central	and	Eastern	European	region	as	well;	unit	 labour	costs	are	usually	cheaper	 in	Bulgaria	and	Romania	than	 in	the	 five	ECE	 countries.	 Corporate	 taxes	 can	 also	 play	 a	 role	 in	 Chinese	 companies'	 decision	 to	invest	 in	 the	 region.	 Nevertheless,	 these	 labour	 cost	 and	 tax	 differences	 within	 the	broader	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 European	 region	 don’t	 seem	 to	 really	 influence	 Chinese	investors	 as	 there	 is	 more	 investment	 from	 China	 in	 ECE	 countries	 (especially	 in	Czechia,	 Hungary	 and	 Poland)	 -	 where	 labour	 costs	 and	 taxes	 are	 relatively	 higher	compared	 to	Romania	and	Bulgaria	 -	 than	 in	Romania	or	Bulgaria.	An	explanation	 for	that	 can	 be	 the	 theory	 of	 agglomeration	 as	 generally	 OFDI	 in	 these	 countries	 is	 the	highest	in	the	region	(McCaleb-Szunomár	2017).	Although	the	above-mentioned	efficiency-seeking	motives	play	a	role,	the	main	type	of	 Chinese	 FDI	 in	 ECE	 countries	 is	 definitely	market-seeking	 investment:	 by	 entering	these	 markets	 Chinese	 companies	 have	 access	 not	 only	 to	 the	 whole	 EU	 market	 but	might	also	be	attracted	by	Free	Trade	Agreements	between	the	EU	and	third	countries	such	as	Canada,	 and	 the	EU	neighbouring	 country	policies	etc.	 as	 they	 claim	 that	 their	ECE	subsidiaries	are	to	sell	products	in	the	host	ECE	countries,	EU,	Northern	American	or	 even	 global	 markets	 (Wiśniewski,	 2012:	 121).	 For	 example,	 Nuctech	 (Poland),	 a	security	 scanning	 equipment	 manufacturer,	 sells	 also	 to	 Turkey;	 Liugong	 Machinery	subsidiary	 in	Poland	 targets	 the	EU,	North	American	and	CIS	markets,	while	Huawei's	logistic	centre	in	Hungary	supplies	over	50	countries	from	Europe	to	North	Africa.	Based	on	the	interviews,	Chinese	companies	wanted	to	have	operations	in	ECE	which	can	either	be	linked	to	their	already	existing	businesses	in	Western	Europe	or	can	help	strengthen	 their	 presence	 on	 the	 wider	 European	market.	 In	 addition,	 there	 are	 also	cases	of	Chinese	companies	following	their	customers	to	the	ECE	region	countries,	as	in	the	case	of	Victory	Technology	(supplier	to	Philips,	LG	and	TPV)	or	Dalian	Talent	Poland	(supplier	of	candles	to	IKEA)	(McCaleb-Szunomár	2017:	125).	Moreover,	Chinese	firms’	ECE	subsidiaries	allow	them	to	participate	in	public	procurements	or	to	access	EU	funds.	Example	 is	 Nuctech	 company	 that	 established	 its	 subsidiary	 in	 Poland	 in	 2004	 and	initially	 targeted	 mainly	 Western	 European	 markets	 but	 focused	 later	 more	 on	 ECE	(CEE)	 region	 which	 benefits	 from	 different	 EU	 funds.	 Recently	 Chinese	 firms	 also	became	interested	in	investing	in	food	industry	as	a	result	of	growing	awareness	about	
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 food	 safety	 standards	 and	 certificates.	 These	 companies	 would	 be	 interested	 in	exporting	 agricultural	products	with	 EU	safety	 certificates	 to	 China	where	 food	 safety	causes	 problems.	 These	 factors,	 however,	 lead	 us	 already	 to	 the	 institutional	 host-country	determinants	of	the	ECE	region.	
Table	2.	Major	characteristics	of	analysed	Chinese	companies	in	ECE	region8	
Location		 Year	of	
investment	
Company	
type	
Industry	 Entry	
mode	
Employees	direct	(indirect)	 Pull	factors	Central	Hungary	 2004/2008	 private	 telecommunications	 greenfield	 330										(over2500)	 macroeconomic,	institutional	(supranational,	national)	Mazovian	(north-eastern)	region	of	Poland	
2007	 private	 telecommunications	 greenfield	 425	 macroeconomic,	institutional	(supranational,	national)	Northern	Hungary	 2011	 state-owned	enterprise	(SOE)	
chemical	 M&A	 over	2500	 macroeconomic,	institutional	(supranational)	Central	Hungary	 2010	 private	 printer	manufacturing,	imaging	technology	 M&A	(acquisition	of	a	company	that	had	a	Hungarian	subsidiary)	
372	 macroeconomic,	institutional	(supranational)	
Northern	Hungary	 2017	 SOE	 automotive	 greenfield	 n.a.	 macroeconomic,	institutional	(supranational,	national)	Mazovian	(north-eastern)	region	of	Poland	
2010	 SOE	 industrial	machinery	 greenfield	 77	 macroeconomic,	institutional	(supranational,	national)	Malopolska	(southern)	region	of	Poland	
2009	 private	 other	miscellaneous	manufacturing	 greenfield	 n.a.	 macroeconomic,	institutional	(supranational,	national)	
Source:	own	compilation	based	on	data	from	Amadeus	Database	We	 can	 further	 specify	 institutional	 factors	 by	 dividing	 them	 into	 two	 levels:	supranational	 and	 national	 levels.	 Both	 levels	 are	 important	 elements	 in	 the	 location	decisions	of	Chinese	companies	in	the	five	ECE	countries	(McCaleb-Szunomár	2017).	As	for	supranational	 institutional	 factors,	we	can	state	 that	 the	change	of	 the	 institutional	
                                               8	 This	 table	 contains	 the	 list	 of	 those	 companies	where	 we	 either	 managed	 to	 conduct	 interviews	 on	investment	motivations	or	collected	information	on	it	from	secondary	sources.		
-	16	-	
Ágnes		Szunomár	/	Pull	factors	for	Chinese	FDI	in	East	Central	Europe	
 setting	of	ECE	countries	due	to	their	economic	integration	into	the	EU	has	been	the	most	important	driver	of	Chinese	outward	FDI	in	the	region,	especially	in	the	manufacturing	sector.	 EU	 membership	 of	 ECE	 countries	 allowed	 Chinese	 investors	 to	 avoid	 trade	barriers	and	ECE	countries	could	also	serve	as	an	assembly	base	for	Chinese	companies.	Moreover,	not	only	 the	membership	but	 the	prospect	of	 their	 accession	attracted	new	Chinese	investors	to	the	region:	some	companies	made	their	first	investments	already	in	the	early	2000's,	before	2004.	New	investments	arrived	in	the	year	of	accession,	too.	The	second	 'wave'	 of	 Chinese	 FDI	 in	 CEE	 dates	 back	 to	 the	 global	 economic	 and	 financial	crisis,	when	financially	destressed	companies	all	over	Europe,	incl.	ECE,	had	often	been	acquired	by	Chinese	companies.	Another	 aspect	 of	 EU	membership	 that	has	 induced	 Chinese	 investment	 in	 the	 five	ECE	countries	is	institutional	stability	(for	example	the	protection	of	property	rights).	It	was	important	for	early	investors	form	Japan	or	Korea	but	was	also	one	of	the	drivers	of	Chinese	 FDI	 due	 to	 the	 unstable	 institutional,	 economic	 and	 political	 environment	 of	their	 home	 country.	 It	 is	 in	 line	with	 the	 findings	 of	 Clegg	 and	Voss	 (2012,	 101)	who	argue	 that	 Chinese	 OFDI	 in	 the	 EU	 shows	 “an	 institutional	 arbitrage	 strategy”	 as	“Chinese	 firms	 invest	 in	 localities	 that	 offer	 clearer,	 more	 transparent	 and	 stable	institutional	 environments.	 Such	 environments,	 like	 the	 EU,	 might	 lack	 the	 rapid	economic	growth	recorded	in	China,	but	they	offer	greater	planning	and	property	rights	security,	 as	 well	 as	 dedicated	 professional	 services	 that	 can	 support	 business	development”.	National-level	 institutional	 factors	 includes,	 for	 example,	 strategic	 agreements,	 tax	incentives	 and	 privatisation	 opportunities.	 The	 significance	 of	 such	 factors	 began	 to	increase	only	 recently,	 as	majority	of	ECE	countries	 -	with	 the	exception	of	Hungary	 -	neglected	relations	with	China	in	the	early	2000's	and	started	to	focus	on	the	potentials	of	this	relationship	only	since	the	aftermath	of	the	global	financial	crisis	of	2008.	Based	on	our	observations	as	well	as	responses	from	interviewees,	Chinese	companies	indeed	appreciate	when	 a	 business	 agreement	 is	 supported	 by	 the	 host	 country	 government,	therefore	 those	 high-level	 strategic	 agreements	 with	 foreign	 companies	 investing	 in	Hungary	offered	by	the	Hungarian	government	could	also	spurred	Chinese	 investment	into	the	region.	Moreover,	personal	(political)	contacts	-	between	the	representatives	of	
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 host	country	governments	and	Chinese	companies	-	also	proved	to	be	important	when	choosing	a	host	country	in	ECE	region.	We	 also	 found	 that	 in	 the	 case	of	 Chinese	MNEs’	motives	 in	 ECE	 region,	 significant	role	 is	 devoted	 to	 other	 less-quantifiable	 aspects,	 such	 as	 the	 size	 and	 feedback	 of	Chinese	 ethnic	 minority	 in	 the	 host	 country,	 investment	 incentives	 and	 subsidies,	possibilities	of	acquiring	visa	and	permanent	residence	permit,	as	well	as	the	quality	of	political	relations	and	government’s	willingness	to	cooperate.	A	clear	example	for	that	is	the	stock	of	Chinese	investment	in	Hungary	that	is	the	highest	in	the	ECE	region	(as	well	as	in	the	broader	Central	and	Eastern	European	region).		Hungary	 is	 a	 country	 where	 the	 combination	 of	 traditional	 economic	 factors	 with	institutional	 ones	 seems	 to	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 attracting	 Chinese	 investors.	Hungary	has	had	historically	good	political	relations	with	China	and	earlier	 than	other	ECE	countries.	The	Hungarian	government	has	intensified	bilateral	relations	in	order	to	attract	 Chinese	 FDI	 already	 from	 2003	 onwards.	 Hungary	 is	 the	 only	 country	 in	 the	region	 that	 introduced	 special	 incentive	 for	 foreign	 investors	 from	 outside	 the	 EU,	 a	'golden	visa'	program,	which	 is	 a	possibility	 to	 receive	a	 residence	visa	when	 fulfilling	the	requirement	of	a	certain	level	of	investment	in	Hungary.	Moreover,	Hungary	has	the	largest	 Chinese	 diaspora	 in	 the	 region	which	 is	 an	 acknowledged	 attracting	 factor	 of	Chinese	 FDI	 in	 the	 extant	 literature,	 that	 is	 a	 relational	 asset	 constituting	 a	 firm’s	ownership	advantage	(Buckley	et	al.,	2007).	An	example	for	this	is	Hisense’s	explanation	of	 the	 decision	 to	 invest	 in	 Hungary	 that	 besides	 traditional	 economic	 factors	 was	motivated	 by	 “good	 diplomatic,	 economic,	 trade	 and	 educational	 relations	with	 China;	big	 Chinese	 population;	 Chinese	 trade	 and	 commercial	 networks,	 associations	 already	formed”	(CIEGA,	2007).	In	addition	to	the	above-mentioned	pull	factors,	Hungary	also	seems	to	be	committed	towards	China	politically.	Hungary	was	among	the	first	to	establish	diplomatic	relations	with	China	(3rd	October	1949),	diplomatic	gestures	and	confidence-building	measures	are	 taken	 from	 time	 to	 time	since	 then.	For	example,	Hungary	was	 the	 first	European	country	to	sign	a	memorandum	of	understanding	with	China	on	promoting	the	Silk	Road	Economic	Belt	and	Maritime	Silk	Road,	during	Chinese	Foreign	Minister	Wang	Yi’s	visit	to	 Budapest	 in	 June,	 2015.	 The	 Hungarian	 government	 was	 also	 very	 keen	 on	 the	
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 Budapest-Belgrade	 railway	 project	 and	when	 it	 signed	 the	 construction	 agreement	 in	2014,	 Prime	 Minister	 Orbán	 called	 it	 the	 most	 important	 moment	 in	 cooperation	between	 the	 European	 Union	 and	 China	 (Keszthelyi	 2014).	 In	 2016,	 Hungary	 (and	Greece)	 prevented	 the	 EU	 from	 backing	 a	 court	 ruling	 against	 China’s	 expansive	territorial	claims	in	the	South	China	Sea	(Economist	2018),	while	Hungary’s	ambassador	to	the	EU	was	alone	not	signing	a	report	in	2018,	criticising	this	Chinese	One	Belt,	One	Road	(OBOR)	initiative	for	benefitting	Chinese	companies	and	Chinese	interests,	and	for	undermining	 principles	of	 free	 trade	 through	 its	 lack	 of	 transparency	 in	 procurement	(Sweet	2018).		Although	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 began	 with	 a	 rather	 cold	 and	 critical	 relationship	towards	 China	 but	moved	 to	 a	more	 specific	 relationship	 recently.	 Since	 then,	we	 can	find	 similar	 political	 factors	 in	 Czech-Chinese	 relations,	 too:	 since	 Czech	 'political	sympathy'	 is	 on	 the	 rise,	 can	we	 experience	 increasing	 inflows	 of	 Chinese	 FDI	 in	 the	Czech	Republic.	An	example	of	this	rising	'political	sympathy'	is	that	the	Czech	president,	Milos	 Zeman	 -	 who	 was	 the	 only	 high-level	 European	 politician	 visiting	 Chinese	celebrations	of	the	end	of	the	II.	World	War	in	2015	-	now	declaredly	wants	his	country	to	be	China’s	“unsinkable	aircraft-carrier”	in	Europe	(Economist	2018).	Mr.	Zeman	also	has	 a	 Chinese	 advisor	 on	 China	 coming	 directly	 from	 a	 Chinese	 company	 with	 a	controversial	background.	As	a	potential	 result	of	 this	politically	 improving	 relation,	 a	Chinese	company	(CEFC)	has	invested	sizeable	amounts	-	1,5	billion	euros	-	in	Czechia	recently.	It	has	to	be	added,	however,	that	this	company	is	now	under	investigation	by	Chinese	authorities	for	"suspicion	of	violation	of	laws"	(Lopatka-Aizhu	2018).		Contrary	 to	 Hungary	 and	 Czechia,	 Poland	 used	 to	 be	 more	 enthusiastic	 about	 the	potentials	of	 its	economic	relationship	with	China	but	 takes	a	more	critical	stance	-	or	even	 cautious	 approach	 -	 recently.	 For	 Poland,	 huge	 high	 trade	 deficit	 represents	 the	biggest	 problem	 in	 its	 bilateral	 ties	 with	 China:	 Poland	 imports	 12	 times	 more	 from	China	 than	 exports,	 while	 the	 deficit	 reaches	 20	 billion	 EUR	 according	 to	 Eurostat.	Potential	 security	 risks	 of	 Chinese	 investments	 also	 made	 the	 Polish	 government	 to	reconsider	its	rather	positive	approach	towards	China	and	use	firm	rhetoric	about	trade	deficit	 as	 a	 serious	 political	 problem.	 This	 reconsideration	 was	 signalled	 by	 the	cancellation	of	a	tender	in	February	2018	for	a	land	in	Łódź	where	a	transhipment	hub	
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 was	to	be	built	and	a	Polish-Chinese	company	was	interested	in	this	property.	Another	example	 was	 a	 government	 advisor's	 statement	 in	 connection	 with	 the	 Central	Communication	 Port,	 a	 current	 flagship	 project	 of	 the	 Polish	 government	 on	 the	rejection	 of	 the	 Chinese	 (party)	 financing	 in	 return	 for	 control	 over	 the	 investment	(Szczudlik	2017).			
	
Conclusions	
Chinese	 investment	 in	 ECE	 countries	 constitutes	 a	 relatively	 small	 share	 in	 China’s	total	FDI	stock	in	Europe	and	is	quite	a	new	phenomenon.	Nevertheless,	Chinese	FDI	in	the	 ECE	 region	 is	 on	 the	 rise	 and	 may	 increase	 further	 due	 to	 recent	 political	developments	 between	 China	 and	 certain	 countries	 of	 the	 region,	 especially	 Hungary,	Czechia	and	-	to	a	lesser	extent	-	Poland.	The	investigation	of	the	motivations	of	Chinese	OFDI	 in	 ECE	 shows	 that	 Chinese	MNEs	mostly	 search	 for	markets.	 ECE	 countries’	 EU	membership	allows	them	to	treat	the	region	as	a	‘back	door’	to	the	affluent	EU	markets	and	Chinese	investors	are	attracted	by	the	relatively	low	labour	costs,	skilled	workforce,	and	 market	 potential.	 It	 is	 characteristic	 that	 their	 investment	 patterns	 in	 terms	 of	country	location	resemble	that	of	the	world	total	FDI	in	the	region.	As	we	 have	 detailed	 in	our	 analysis	 above,	macroeconomic	 or	 structural	 factors	do	not	 fully	explain	 the	decisions	behind	Chinese	FDI	 in	 the	broader	Central	 and	Eastern	European	 region,	 including	ECE	countries.	For	example,	Hungary,	Czechia	and	Poland,	the	 three	 largest	 recipients	 of	 Chinese	 investment	 in	 CEE,	 are	 not	 the	most	 attractive	locations	 in	 terms	 of	 either	 cutting	 costs	 or	 the	 search	 for	 potential	 markets	 in	 the	broader	CEE	region.	This	 indicates	 that	 institutions	may	be	crucial	when	searching	 for	locations	for	Chinese	companies.		To	map	 out	 the	 real	 significance	 of	 institutional	 factors,	 we	 divided	 them	 into	 two	levels:	supranational	and	national.	Supranational	factors	that	pulls	Chinese	companies	to	the	 ECE	 region	 are	 connected	 to	 the	 EU	 membership	 (economic	 integration)	 of	 ECE	countries,	 especially	 to	 the	 institutional	 stability	 provided	 by	 the	 EU.	 Country	 or	national-level	 institutional	 factors	 that	 impact	 location	 choice	 within	 ECE	 countries	
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 seem	to	be	privatization	opportunities,	investment	 incentives	such	as	 tax	 incentives	or	special	economic	zones,	'golden	visas'	or	resident	permits	in	exchange	for	given	amount	of	investment,	as	well	as	the	size	of	Chinese	ethnic	population	in	the	host	country.	Although	we	couldn't	 find	a	 clear	evidence	yet	 for	 casual	 links	between	 the	 level	of	political	relations	and	the	amount	of	Chinese	investment	in	ECE	countries,	good	political	relations	between	host	country	and	China	seems	to	play	an	important	role	in	attracting	investment	 from	Chinese	 state-owned	 as	well	 as	 private	 companies.	 Examples	 are	 (1)	Hungary's	good	political	relations	and	strong	political	commitment	towards	China,	while	hosting	the	biggest	stock	of	Chinese	FDI	 in	 the	ECE	as	well	as	 the	broader	CEE	region;	and	 (2)	 the	 positive	 political	 shift	 in	 Czech-Chinese	 relations	 that	 induced	 increasing	amounts	of	Chinese	FDI	in	the	Czech	Republic.	In	 order	 to	 find	 clear	 evidence	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 political	 factor	 -	or	 "friendship	factor"	-	among	pull	factors	for	Chinese	FDI	in	the	ECE	region,	we	will	use	a	case-study	approach	 in	 the	 next	 phase	 of	 the	 research:	 we	 will	 conduct	 firm-level	 in-depth	interviews	with	 the	most	 important	Chinese	 companies	 that	have	 invested	 in	 the	ECE	region,	 try	 to	make	personal	 interviews	with	government	officials	 and	 involve	 further	experts	from	academia	as	well	as	business	organizations.		
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